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The article is devoted to the study of the evolution of the European Union (EU) ap-
proach towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The paper refers to the case 
study method used to assess the EU’s capacity to respond adequately to the partic-
ular mass atrocity cases – Libya, South Sudan, and Myanmar. The methodology of 
the paper is based on a discursive analytical approach, which requires a thorough 
examination of the official declarations, statements, and resolutions adopted by the 
EU in the scope of EU foreign and security policy.  The article focuses on clear dis-
tinctions between the EU’s approach to these cases, reveals several weaknesses and 
hidden reputational risks in the EU’s response to mass atrocity situations as well as 
offers several recommendations on how to overcome identified deficiencies. 
KEYWORDS: EU, Mass Atrocities, Responsibility to Protect, Libya, Myanmar, 
South Sudan.
1. INTRODUCTION
The EU is a highly integrated and influential block in Europe, with a norma-
tive reach that increasingly seeks to go beyond its borders. Through its sig-
nificant attraction, pressure and persuasion, the Union increasingly claims to 
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be a global actor and agent of change outside its borders. Alongside with the 
substantial soft power through conflict resolution and development assistance, 
the EU also possesses the ability to use coercive power through sanctions and 
military interventions. By creating the idea of a global actor, the EU sends the 
messages that it is capable to fight against any injustice outside its borders 
as well as assumes its part of the responsibility for global security. However, 
some critics argue that the Union’s response to particular mass atrocity situa-
tions shows a gap between EU rhetoric and action. Others emphasize that the 
EU fuels unrealistic expectations as to its role in preventing mass atrocities. 
The aim of this paper is to conduct a comprehensive study of the evolution 
of the EU approach towards the R2P as well as to assess the EU’s capacity to 
act quickly and decisively in actual mass atrocity situations that occurred in 
Libya, South Sudan and Myanmar.
This paper strives to provide answers to the following three questions: wheth-
er the scope of the EU’s commitment to R2P is understood and perceived 
similarly by the key EU’s institutions based on the analysis of the official doc-
uments and statements; how the understanding of the EU’s commitment to the 
R2P is reflected in Union’s response to the actual situations of mass atrocities 
based on the analysis of three cases; to what extent the EU’s tools and policies 
are adequate in three cases.
The methodology used in the paper is a discursive analytical approach, which 
requires a thorough examination of the official declarations, statements, and 
resolutions adopted by the EU in the scope of EU foreign and security policy. 
These documents will allow not only to examine the EU’s role it seeks to per-
form but also to observe key patterns, trends, and changes in the EU official 
position towards its responsibility for global security. Alongside the qualita-
tive content analysis of relevant documents and official statements, we rely on 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Violence Dataset) as our primary source for 
collecting data on the peaks of mass atrocity incidents which constitute a time 
frame for analyzing EU’s response. The paper refers to the case study method 
used to assess the EU’s capacity to respond adequately to the particular mass 
atrocity cases.  We then offer a comparative analysis to identify and explain 
existing variation in terms of EU responses to mass atrocities in our three 
cases – Libya (2011-2012), South Sudan (2014-2015), and Myanmar (2017-
2018). 
The issues which this paper addresses belong to a broader debate of the role 
of the EU as a global actor and agent of change in international relations. This 
issue has been addressed by Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler1, Ian Man-
1  Bretherton C., Vogler, J.: The European Union as Global Actor, 2nd Edition, London, 
Routledge, 2006, 273 p.
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ners2, etc. In this regard, the vast majority of literature focuses on the EU’s 
potential to act as a normative power. However, there is a number of scholars 
examining the potential of the EU for peace-building or achieving its goals 
through funding such as Faria Fernanda and Richard Youngs3, Nathalie Tocci4 
and Jonathan Spyer5. Nonetheless, few scholars have examined the effective-
ness of the EU foreign policy instruments in the fight against mass atrocities 
(e.g. Karen E. Smith6, Jan Wouters, Philip De Man, and Marie Vincent7).
The significance of this paper lies in its implications for the EU. A thorough 
understanding of the EU’s foreign policy will allow Brussels to select the most 
appropriate modalities of engagement as well as develop the most efficient 
mechanisms for countering mass atrocity crimes.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE EU’S APPROACH TOWARDS FIGHT 
AGAINST MASS ATROCITIES
The EU has been perceived as a particularly suitable candidate for prevent-
ing egregious human rights violations. Besides, given that mass atrocities are 
understood as the anti-thesis to development, the EU, as the world’s biggest 
aid donor, is perceived as a key player in the nexus believed by some to exist 
between development and mass atrocity prevention. 
Since the beginning of the new century, the EU has made considerable pro-
gress in affirming its role as an international actor willing to act in mass 
atrocity cases. The European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Bet-
2  Manners, I.: Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 13(2) 2006.
3  Fernanda, F., Youngs, R.: European Conflict Resolution Policies: Truncated Peacebuild-
ing, Fride Working Paper, 2010, [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131019/WP94_UE_Paz_Con-
struccion_ENG_mar10.pdf ], accessed on 03/11/2019.
4  Tocci, N.: Regional origins, global aspirations: the European Union as a global conflict 
manager, in: Stefan Wolff and ChristallaYakinthou (eds.), Conflict Management in Divided 
Societies. Theories and Practice, London and New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 135-150.
5  Spyer, J.: Europe and Iraq: Test Case for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mid-
dle East Review of International Affairs, 11(2) 2007.
6  Smith, K.: Still “Civilian Power EU”?, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, 
European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, No. 1/2005, [https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/
wp-content/uploads/2018/08/EU-and-RTP-in-an-illiberal-era.pdf], accessed on 05/11/2019.
7  Wouters, J., De Man, Ph., Vincent, M.: The Responsibility to Protect: Where Does the 
EU Stand? Policy Brief No. 10 – November 2008, [https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/228684679_The_Responsibility_to_Protect_Where_Does_the_EU_Stan], accessed on 
05/11/2019.
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ter World”8 brought the first novelty in the scope of EU foreign and security 
policy ambitions. Drafted in mid-2003 and agreed formally by the European 
Council in December 2003, the European Security Strategy made it clear that 
none of the threats could be addressed with purely military means, and that 
preventive engagement is the best way to try to ensure that situations do not 
escalate or deteriorate. The European Security Strategy calls for more coher-
ent policies, bringing together different instruments including aid, military ca-
pabilities, trade, and so on. There is a shared and clear preference to intervene 
earlier with a broad range of instruments and thus perhaps reduce the need 
to use military means. However, the critics argued that the adoption of the 
European Security Strategy did not make clear the issue of how the EU would 
protect civilians in case of mass atrocities9. Even though the European Secu-
rity Strategy considered human security as a priority, there was no mention of 
the role the EU could play in such situations as genocide in order to save the 
affected population. This issue was addressed less than a year later. As part of 
the Headline Goal 2010 approved by General Affairs and External Relations 
Council on 17 May 2004, the EU embarked on a new challenge of creating ten 
rapid reaction battle-groups that could potentially act in situations concerning 
the protection of civilians10.
At the 2005 World Summit, the EU members expressed their endorsement and 
support of R2P which suggests that states have the primary responsibility to 
protect their populations (Pillar One), but also that the international commu-
nity should assist states in this duty (Pillar Two) and when a state is unable 
or unwilling to protect its population from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war 
crimes and/or crimes against humanity, the international community should 
do so through any appropriate means (Pillar Three)11. R2P thus emerged as a 
vehicle for cementing obligations of host and third-party states to ensure con-
sistent and effective human protection from mass atrocity crimes12.
8  European Union (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 
Brussels, [https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-bet-
ter-world], accessed on 03/11/2019.
9  Biscop, S.: The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power, 
Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2005, p. 26. 
10  Council Press Release (2004), General Affairs and External Relations, Luxembourg. 
[https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/80498.pdf], ac-
cessed on 03/11/2019.
11  United Nations General Assembly (2005) Resolution № 60/1: 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/
docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf], accessed on 03/11/2019.
12  Nahlawi, Y. The responsibility to Protect in Libya and Syria: Mass Atrocities, Human 
Protection and International Law, Routledge, 2019, p. 172
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 A year later, the EU, as the biggest provider of development aid, signed 
“the European Consensus on Development” in 2006, in which all three of the 
principal EU institutions declared that they “cannot stand by, as genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of international humanitar-
ian law and human rights are committed”. The EU affirmed its willingness to 
support “a strengthened role for the regional and sub-regional organizations 
in the process of enhancing international peace and security, including their 
capacity to coordinate donor support in the area of conflict prevention”13.
In 2008, the EU issued a report on the implementation of the European Secu-
rity Strategy “Providing Security in a Changing World” which identified the 
key threats facing the Union and defines its strategic objectives. This docu-
ment refers directly to the necessity for all states to “take responsibility for 
the consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity”14. 
In the second decade of the XXI century the key EU institutions in this area – 
European Council, Commission, European Parliament, and Council –propose 
diverging conceptions dividing them on the issue of the interpretation of the 
R2P principle.
The European Parliament, considering the R2P a preventive doctrine and mil-
itary intervention the last resort in R2P situations, emphasizes its preference 
for diplomatic and long-term developmental activities. Its recommendation 
to the Council of 18 April 2013 on the UN principle of the ‘Responsibility 
to Protect’ (‘R2P’)15 suggests integrating the R2P principle in the EU’s de-
velopment assistance and including a chapter in the HR/VP’s annual report 
to Parliament on the CFSP concerning the EU’s actions in applying the R2P 
principle. The focus on capacity-building in the fields of human rights, good 
governance, the rule of law, the reduction of poverty, and ensuring education 
alongside the non-military coercive alternatives, such as preventive diploma-
cy, sanctions, accountability mechanisms, and mediation is repeated in the 
13  European Parliament, Council and Commission (2006), Joint statement by the Council 
and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, 
the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The 
European Consensus’, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ%3AC%3
A2006%3A046%3A0001%3A0019%3AEN%3APDF], accessed on 10/11/2019.
14  Council Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008), 
Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf], accessed on 09/11/2019.
15  European Parliament Recommendation to the Council of 18 April 2013 on the UN prin-
ciple of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (‘R2P’). [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?reference=P7-TA-2013-0180&type=TA&language=EN&redirect], accessed on 09/11/2019.
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present recommendation and subsequent resolutions16.
The Commission in its Joint Communication on the EU’s Comprehensive Ap-
proach to External Conflict and Crises in 201317 sets out its understanding 
of the EU’s comprehensive approach as a way to react to external conflict, 
including those which possess a high risk of mass atrocities. Joint Commu-
nication which refers to the EU as the world’s largest trading block names a 
wide array of policies, tools, and instruments at the EU’s disposal– spanning 
the diplomatic, security, defense, financial, trade, development cooperation, 
and humanitarian aid fields.
The Council in its Conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach dated 
201418, on the other hand, reiterates the important role of CSDP, including its 
civilian and military expertise and civilian-military synergies, as an essential 
element in the EU’s comprehensive approach and emphasized the need for the 
EU to better, earlier and more systematically link up its political engagement 
and its CSDP missions and operations. The particular emphasis is made on the 
ability to play a positive and transformative role in its external relations and 
act as a global actor.
The European Council in its Global Strategy for the European Union’s For-
eign and Security Policy adopted in 201619 stated that the EU will also pro-
mote the responsibility to protect in order to prevent or end mass atrocities. 
Besides, it signaled that building the resilience of societies would help prevent 
conflicts and crises.
At the 2018 debate on the R2P at the UN General Assembly, the EU ambassa-
dor once again confirmed that the EU was born “in a spirit of ‘never again’” 
and so the R2P “is at the core of our primary goal, namely to allow our popu-
lations to live in peace and security”20.
16  European Parliament Resolution of 16 December 2015 on preparing for the World Hu-
manitarian Summit: Challenges and opportunities for humanitarian assistance, [https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015IP0459&from=EN], accessed 
on 09/11/2019.
17  European Parliament and Council (2013), Joint communication. The EU’s comprehen-
sive approach to external conflict and crises, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TX-
T/?uri=CELEX%3A52013JC0030].
18  Council Conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach, of 12 May 2014, [https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/media/28344/142552.pdf], accessed on 10/11/2019.
19  European Union (2016), Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global 
Strategy for the European Union Foreign and Security Policy, Luxembourg, [http://europa.
eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf], accessed on 
10/11/2019.
20  European External Action Service (2018b), Statement on behalf of the EU and its Mem-
ber States by Ambassador Joanne Adamson, Deputy Head of Delegation, at the UN Gener-
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Three case studies – Libya, South Sudan, and Myanmar – will help us to 
assess the EU’s capacity to act quickly and decisively in actual mass atrocity 
situations. These three cases were selected taking into account the fact the EU 
has the potential to have a particular influence there. Libya, South Sudan and 
Myanmar are not the locations of intensive outside intervention contrary to 
Syria and the countries concerned had been the subject of EU foreign policies 
before violence erupted.
3. THE CASE STUDY
3.1. THE LIBYA CASE
The conflict in Libya started in 2011 with the arrest of civil rights activists 
which quickly developed into the full-scale protests and eventually led to a 
civil war. As soon as the Libyan government responded violently to the rebel-
lion against it, the international community reacted by invoking R2P’s meas-
ure of last resort.
In March 2011, the European Parliament condemned in the strongest terms 
the blatant and systemic violations of human rights in Libya and stressed that 
the EU and its Member States must honor their Responsibility to Protect, to 
save Libyan civilians from large-scale armed attacks21. In September 2011, in 
response to the fall of Gaddafi, the European Parliament adopted a resolution 
that welcomed the collapse of the former regime and expressed the full sup-
port to the interim authority of the Libyan National Transitional Council. The 
resolution also stressed that there should be no impunity for crimes against 
humanity and that Muammar Gaddafi and members of his regime must be 
held responsible and put to trial for their crimes under the rule of law22.
Apart from the European Parliament resolutions, the European Commission 
reacted to the Libyan crisis by launching two of its major emergency instru-
ments: the civil protection mechanism and humanitarian assistance. Activated 
al Assembly Debate on “The responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquar-
ters/headquarters-homepage/47293/ debate-responsibility-protect-and-prevention-genoci-
de-war-crimes-ethnic-cleansing-and-crimes_en], accessed on 10/11/2019.
21  European Parliament (2011a) Resolution of 10 March 2011 on the Southern Neighbour-
hood, and Libya in particular,[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0095+0+DOC+ XML+V0//EN], accessed on 05/12/2019.
22  European Parliament (2011b) Resolution of 15 September 2011 on the situation in 
Libya, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&refer-
ence=P7-TA-2011-386] accessed on 05/12/2019.
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on 23 February 2011, the civil protection mechanism facilitated member state 
consular operations by pooling and identifying transport means for the evac-
uation of an estimated 5,800 EU citizens. However, these actions provoked 
strong criticism as the EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Hu-
manitarian Aid and Crisis Response Kristalina Georgieva23was one of many 
who reminded the EU of its Responsibility to protect not only its own citizens 
but also the Libyan population. Besides, within the framework of the Euro-
pean Commission humanitarian aid department (ECHO), €150,799, 072 has 
been contributed by the EU for humanitarian aid and civil protection24. Along-
side the humanitarian aid, in 2011 the Strategy for Security and Development 
in the Sahel had announced EUR 24.5 million in EU assistance to Libya, allo-
cated under the European Development Fund, Instrument for Stability, Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, thematic programs, and budget lines. 
Most importantly, the EU adopted sanctions against Libya on February 28, 
201125. The Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP introduced arms embargo, as-
sets freeze & travel bans against individuals and entities. The Council also 
adopted the Regulation No 204/2011 in order to implement the measures pro-
vided for in Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP that fall under the competence 
of the Union. It requires the Member States to determine the penalties applica-
ble to infringements of their provisions. 26 Although both these documents do 
not contain any mentioning of “mass atrocities”, the restrictive measures were 
adopted in the light of “serious human rights abuses”.
Condemning “the gross and systematic violation of human rights, violence, 
and brutal repression” 27, the Council adopted the decision on the launch of 
EUFOR Libya military operation to support humanitarian assistance opera-
23  European Union (2011), Statement by Kristalina Georgieva, Commissioner for Interna-
tional Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, on the deteriorating humanitarian 
situation in Misrata, Libya. [https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/statement-kristalina-georgie-
va-commissioner-international-cooperation-humanitarian-aid], accessed on 05/12/2019.
24  European Commission Official Website: European Commission Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection, [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/libya_factsheet.pdf], accessed 
on 05/12/2019.
25  Council Decision No 2011/137/CFSP of 28 February 2011 concerning restrictive measures 
in view of the situation in Libya, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=O-
J:L:2011:058:0053:0062:EN:PDF], accessed on 05/12/2019.
26  Council Regulation No 204/2011 of 2 March 2011 concerning restrictive measures in view 
of the situation in Libya, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX-
:32011R0204&from=EN], accessed on 05/12/2019.
27  Council Decision No 2011/210/CFSP of 1 April 2011 on a European Union military 
operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situa-
tion in Libya (EUFOR Libya), [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=O-
J:L:2011:089:0017:0020:EN:PDF], accessed on 05/12/2019.
125
D. Dvornichenko, V. Barskyy: The EU and responsibility to protect: Case studies on the EU’s response to mass...
tions. However, the Decision was not implemented as there was no UN call 
for such use, and some EU battle groups member states (Sweden28) were not 
willing to act.
The actual test for the EU unity took place on 17 March 2011 when the United 
Nations Security Council adopted the Resolution 1973 which authorized “to 
take all necessary means to protect civil population” –although specifically 
“excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan ter-
ritory”, but including the possibility of a limited air intervention. While three 
EU members of the Security Council voted in favor, the forth – Germany – 
abstained. This publicly displayed disunity over a vital conflict in Europe’s 
direct vicinity amounts to the disintegration of Europe as a political actor29.
The outcome of the deep disagreements among leading EU member-states led 
to the situation when the EU’s CSDP was excluded from the tools available 
to the EU to address the Libya crisis. The member-states did not rely on the 
CSDP even when it came to evacuating EU citizens. The evacuation was car-
ried out by the EU member-states30.
The Libya crisis is considered a first foreign-security test for the Lisbon Treaty, 
European security culture, and the R2P. Critics argue that the EU’s response to 
it was too weak and incoherent.  As Nicole Koenig clearly states “while there 
has been a multifaceted EU response to the Libyan crisis, nearly every facet 
of this response was marked by vertical incoherence”31. However, the Libya 
crisis was the first one that explicitly demonstrated the EU’s understanding of 
the R2P as the prevention and re-building rather than military protection.
3.2. THE SOUTH SUDAN CASE
South Sudan gained its independence in 2011. However, in 2013, civil war 
broke out between rival political and ethnic groups. It is estimated that up to 
300,000 people have been killed. In December 2013, UN Special Adviser on 
the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, and the UN Special Adviser on 
28  Dembinski, M., & Reinold, T.: Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect –
African and European Perspectives, Peace Research Institute Report, Frankfurt, 2011, p.11, 
[https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif107.pdf], accessed on 03/12/2019.
29  Stavridis, S., EU incoherence and inconsistency over Libya: evidence to the contrary. - 
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 89 2014, p.165.
30  Fabbrini, S.: The European Union and the Libyan crisis. International Politics, 51(2) 2014, 
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263326293_The_European_Union_and_the_Liby-
an_crisis], accessed on 03/12/2019.
31  Koenig, N.: The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In Quest of Coherence, The International Spec-
tator, 46 (4), 2011, p. 10, [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2011.62808
9?scroll=top&needAccess=true], accessed on 03/12/2019.
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the Responsibility to Protect, Jennifer Welsh, expressed their concern about 
the ethnic-based violence and warned that attacks on civilians could constitute 
war crimes and crimes against humanity32.
The EU’s language, on the contrary, was more reserved. The European Par-
liament in the resolution of 13 November 2014 calls upon the international 
community to hold accountable those who perpetrated “gross human rights”33, 
while the Council Regulation adopted in 2015 points at “serious human rights 
violations”.34
Talking about the EU’s actual response, here Brussels has used a vast array 
of tools. In 2012 the Council of the EU agreed to deploy a civilian CSDP 
mission, EUVASEC, which consisted of 60 personnel members and aimed 
at improving aviation security at Juba international airport. However, at the 
outbreak of the civil war, the mission was evacuated in 2013 and the member 
states failed to renew it. Besides, in 2013 when the civil war had already start-
ed the EU terminated the mandate of the EU Special Representative to Sudan 
and South Sudan.35
Though within the period in question – 2014-2015- the EU did not rely on the 
CSDP component, it was quite active in humanitarian policies. Humanitarian 
aid from the EU to South Sudan amounted to €95 million.36 The European 
Commission also presented an ad hoc programming document for the €150 
million Special Funds for Sudan program. Additional funding dependent on 
the accession of South Sudan to the Cotonou Agreement (which in its turn 
requires from the countries respect of human rights, democratic principles and 
the rule of law) could also be provided to South Sudan through the European 
Development Fund. In 2014 due to the non-accession of South Sudan to the 
32  United Nations Press Release (2013), Statement by Adama Dieng, United Nations Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, and Jennifer Welsh, United Nations Special Adviser 
on the Responsibility to Protect, on the Situation in South Sudan, [http://www.un.org/en/geno-
cideprevention/documents/media/statements/2013/English/2013-12-24-Statement%20on%20 
South%20Sudan.pdf], accessed on 05/12/2019.
33  European Parliament Resolution of 13 November 2014 on the humanitarian situation in 
South Sudan, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2014-0053_EN.html], 
accessed on 05/12/2019.
34  Council Regulation No 2015/735 of 7 May 2015 concerning restrictive measures in respect 
of the situation in South Sudan, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 748/2014, [https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R0735], accessed on 05/12/2019.
35  Smith, K.: The EU and the Responsibility to Protect in an Illiberal Era. Dahrendorf Fo-
rum Working Paper, 3, 2018, p. 19
[http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90083/1/Smith_EU-Responsibility-to-Protect_Published.pdf], ac-
cessed on 11/12/2019.
36  European Commission Official Website: South Sudan factsheet, [https://ec.europa.eu/
echo/where/africa/south-sudan_en], accessed on 11/12/2019.
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Cotonou Agreement, it did not have the right to development assistance of 
the 10th European Development Fund (EDF), which amounted to 300 million 
euros for the period 2008–2013. However, it did not prevent the EU from pro-
viding left-over funds from the 9th EDF to South Sudan37.
The EU also acted as the lead mediator to empower the Intergovernmental Au-
thority on Development (IGAD), an eight-country regional bloc.  In August 
2015, when the “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan” 
(ARCSS) was signed under the auspices of IGAD, the EU assumed a formal 
role in the implementation of the agreement.
The EU also adopted restrictive measures, in contrast to the UN, which failed 
to reach an agreement on this issue. Following the July 2011 Council Deci-
sion, which amended the arms embargo to cover both Sudan and South Su-
dan, in 2014 the EU adopted the Council Regulation concerning restrictive 
measures in respect of the situation in South Sudan38 (which provided the 
introduction of sanctions against 2 persons) and separately Council Regula-
tion concerning restrictive measures given the situation in Sudan (imposing 
sanctions against 4 persons)39. What is interesting is the fact that although both 
documents maintained the arms embargo, the supply of non-lethal military 
equipment was exempted from the arms embargo. Besides, according to the 
Conflict Armament Research40, the restrictions meant little. Small arms and 
ammunition from the EU member states that were supposed to be exported 
to Uganda, South Sudan’s neighbor, ended up in the hands of Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army which provoked more violence and mass atrocities.
37  Zwan, J.: Evaluating the EU’s role and challenges in Sudan and South Sudan Sudan and 
South Sudan Case Study. Initiative for Peacebuilding – Early Warning Analysis to Action (IfP-
EW) Report, The International Alert, Brussels, 2011, p. 18. [https://www.international-alert.
org/sites/default/files/publications/092011IfPEWSudan_0.pdf], accessed on 17/12/2019.
38  Council Regulation No 747/2014 of 10 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view 
of the situation in Sudan, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CEL-
EX:32014R0748], accessed on 17/12/2019.
39  Council Regulation No 748/2014 of 10 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in re-
spect of the situation in South Sudan, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PD-
F/?uri=CELEX:32014R0747&from=EN], accessed on 17/12/2019.
40  Conflict Armament Research. Sudanese Stockpiles and Regional Weapon Di-
version, London, 2017, p. 10, [file:///D:/%D0%97%D0%B0%D0%B3%D1%80%D1%8
3%D0%B7%D0%BA%D0%B8/Sudanese-Stockpiles-and-Regional-Weapons-Diver-
sions-1%20(1).pdf], accessed on 17/12/2019.
Intereulaweast, Vol. VII (1) 2020
128
3.3. THE MYANMAR CASE
The Rohingya is a group of heavily persecuted Muslims mainly residing with-
in the Rakhine State in the Buddhist-majority nation of Myanmar. According 
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, around 200 000 Ro-
hingya have fled Myanmar in just the last five years. 
The first document that condemns the actions of Myanmar military and secu-
rity forces towards Rohingya was adopted by the Council in February 2018, 
in which the EU classifies the situation around the Muslim community in the 
Rakhine State as “widespread, systematic grave human rights violations”41. 
Following the Council Conclusions, the European Parliament in the resolution 
of 14 June 2018 points at  “serious human rights violations” in Myanmar and 
expresses support to investigations into alleged atrocity crimes in the Rakhine 
State 42
As for the actual tools, the EU response to the situation in Myanmar does not 
differ a lot from the one in South Sudan. The humanitarian aid again has be-
come the primary tool at the disposal of the EU to provide assistance to the af-
fected population. In 2018, the European Union has allocated € 9.4 million in 
humanitarian aid, which is not targeted at solely Rohingya, but also includes 
Kachin and Shan states, as well as addresses the immediate needs of fami-
lies affected by both natural disaster and conflict in Myanmar43.  Additionally, 
in May 2018, the EU released €40 million to provide support to vulnerable 
Rohingya civilians across Rakhine State44. Meanwhile, the EU has provided 
€688 million under the Multi-annual Indicative Programmed 2014-2020 to 
the Myanmar government which has been accused by the Independent in-
ternational fact-finding mission of “genocidal intent” against the Rohingya45. 
Mediation is another instrument the EU has at its disposal to address the situa-
41  Council Conclusions on Myanmar/Burma, of 26 February 2018, [http://data.consilium.
europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6418-2018-INIT/en/pdf], accessed on 28/12/2019.
42  European Parliament Resolution of 14 June 2018 on the situation of Rohingya refugees, 
in particular the plight of children, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-
2018-0261_EN.html], accessed on 28/12/2019.
43  European Commission Official Website: European Civil Protection and Humanitari-
an Aid Operations, [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-commits-9-million-humanitari-
an-aid-most-vulnerable-families-myanmar_en], accessed on 28/12/2019.
44  European External Action Service (2018a), Factsheet. EU-Myanmar relations, Brussels, 
[https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4004/EU-Myanmar%20re-
lations], accessed on 28/12/2019.
45  Human Rights Council, (2018), Report of the independent international fact-finding mis-
sion on Myanmar, [https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myan-
mar/A_HRC_39_64.pdf], accessed on 28/12/2019.
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tion in Myanmar. According to the statement by HR/VP Federica Mogherini46, 
the EU has been fully “mobilized politically and through extensive humanitar-
ian assistance to help find a sustainable solution” to the crisis. Since 2017 the 
EU has been monitoring the implementation of the repatriation agreement be-
tween Myanmar and Bangladesh according to which Myanmar is obliged to 
create the conditions on the ground that will allow for a return of the refugees 
to their places of origin.
What differs the EU response to mass atrocities in Myanmar from the situation 
in Libya and South Sudan is the restrictive measures or, to be more accurate, 
the delay of the EU to impose them. In far 2013, just after the publication of 
the Human Rights Watch report pointing at the clear evidence of government 
complicity in ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity against Muslims 
in Rakhine state, the EU lifted the last of its trade, economic and individual 
sanctions against Myanmar. The decision was made in response to Myanmar’s 
new reform political program thus encouraging the transition of the country 
from almost half a century of military dictatorship and promoting democratic 
improvements. Only in 2018 following the declarations by Federica Mogher-
ini regarding the EU willingness to impose sanctions against Myanmar47, the 
Council adopted the restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma48, which 
provided for entry-bans into the EU for seven members of the Burmese secu-
rity forces who have been demonstrably involved in human rights violations 
against Rohingya as well as the freezing of their assets. The restrictive meas-
ures also included a ban on military cooperation with the armed forces and 
security forces and the arms embargo. 
However, the effectiveness of sanctions can be questioned in view of their 
possible impact on bilateral trade with the EU. The EU ranked as the fourth 
biggest trade partner of Myanmar (after China, Thailand, and Singapore), ac-
counting for 9% of the country’s total trade while Myanmar is the EU’s 75th 
46  European Union (2017), Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Fed-
erica Mogherini on the signing of a bilateral repatriation agreement between the gov-
ernments of Myanmar and Bangladesh. Brussels, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headquarters-homepage/36113/statement-hrvp-federica-mogherini-signing-bilateral-repatri-
ation-agreement-between-governments_en], accessed on 28/12/2019.
47  European Union (2018), Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
Mogherini at the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, Luxembourg, [https://
reliefweb.int/report/world/remarks-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogheri-
ni-press-conference-0], accessed on 30/12/2019.
48  Council Decision No 2018/900 of 25 June 2018 amending Decision 2013/184/CFSP con-
cerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.LI.2018.160.01.0009.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2018:160I:TOC], ac-
cessed on 30/12/2019.
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largest trading partner (accounting for 0.1% of the EU’s total trade)49. Myan-
mar is a beneficiary of duty and quota-free access to the EU market through 
“Everything But Arms” (EBA) agreement of the Generalised Scheme of Pref-
erences (GSP) which allows Myanmar to sell any products, except for arms 
and ammunition, to the EU market without facing tariffs or quotas.  As the 
participation in EBA is conditional upon respect to fundamental rights, it pro-
vides the EU with another tool to exert pressure on Myanmar. The Council’s 
conclusions on Myanmar, which expressed deep concern over the findings of 
the independent international fact-finding mission of the UN Human Rights 
Council which concluded that gross human rights violations were committed 
in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States, in particular by the Myanmar Armed 
Forces, clearly stated that the respect of human and labor rights underpins the 
granting of trade preferences50. However, the significant economic ramifica-
tions for Myanmar, given the EU’s role as a significant export market, includ-
ing job losses and reduction of foreign investment, on the one hand, and possi-
ble losses for the EU in case of Myanmar’s reorientation towards China make 
the withdrawal of trade preferences less and less likely to be implemented. 
49  European Commission Official Website: Myanmar, [https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/myanmar/], accessed on 30/12/2019.
50  Council Conclusions on Myanmar/Burma, of 10 December 2018, [http://data.consilium.
europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15033-2018-INIT/en/pdf], accessed on 30/12/2019.
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4. FINDINGS
A comparison of instruments in terms of EU responses to mass atrocities in 
three cases:
Libya South Sudan Myanmar
Terminology 





























































Initiated but not 
implemented Not implemented Not implemented
Withdrawal of 
trade preferences Not available Not available
Initiated but 
not approved 
within the period 
analyzed
The findings of this paper summarized below offer an insight into the EU’s 
capacity to respond to three mass atrocity situations.
Firstly, three cases demonstrate that the EU’s language remains cautious, often 
referring to serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, rather 
than “genocide” or “crimes against humanity”. So far the EU has classified the 
situation in South Sudan as widespread “systemic abuse” and the European 
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Parliament resolution of 14 June 2018 on the situation of Rohingya refugees 
refers to “alleged mass atrocities” committed by Myanmar security forces in 
Rakhine. Besides, the EU is reluctant to be first to acknowledge the fact that 
mass atrocities are occurring or that there is a serious risk of mass atrocities 
being perpetrated. Waiting for the warnings issued by other international ac-
tors the EU loses both the momentum and capacity to respond adequately to 
actual mass atrocity situations. 
Secondly, three cases demonstrate that the EU’s actions also remain cautious 
with a clear trend to integrate them into conflict management policy. The pre-
vailing view in the EU is that mass atrocities do not require a special set of 
tools. Such a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach deprives the EU of the required flex-
ibility and capacity to act quickly. Some measures aimed at democratization 
or promotion of human rights might be relevant in conflict management, but 
seem inadequate in the actual mass atrocity cases. The desired impartiality in 
conflict management can also undermine the capacity of the EU to respond 
decisively in mass atrocity cases and protect victims from the crimes which 
are covered by R2P.  Besides, the content analysis of the EU official docu-
ments reveals the divergence among three EU institutions in their preferences 
of tools and instruments available to the Union within R2P. With the European 
Parliament’s preference for diplomatic and long-term developmental activi-
ties, the Commission’s emphasis on trade instruments, the Council’s focus on 
the importance of the CSDP component, the EU lacks a clear understanding 
of its scope of commitments under R2P. 
Thirdly, the diversity in views among the member-states remains and becomes 
obvious when the issue of the military operation is discussed. There is no 
consensus over the use of measures to protect populations that require more 
ambitious actions. A number of the EU member-states are still unable or un-
willing to contemplate the use of force to protect populations from atrocities 
thus making the implementation of the third pillar of R2P by the EU extremely 
difficult and contributing to the further division inside the EU. There is no EU 
military doctrine regarding the response to mass atrocities. Besides, there are 
no specific military scenarios that facilitate the execution of CSDP operations 
as the response to mass atrocities. This is partly because some member-states 
prefer to engage with the third pillar of R2P through other institutions, notably 
the NATO.
Fourthly, Myanmar’s case demonstrates a clear shift in the EU foreign policy 
to a more pragmatic approach where the Union strives to strike a balance be-
tween external interests and a norm-based approach. The delay in imposing 
sanctions on Myanmar and reluctance to withdraw trade preferences raises 
several questions regarding the possible clash of the EU’s interests with its 
obligations in terms of R2P. Following the logic of the EU global strategy 
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2016, an ambitious trade agreement with a democratically regressive regime 
that might be also involved in perpetrating mass atrocities can be defended on 
the grounds that it will advance the resilience of the partner society. What falls 
outside of this logic is how to perform the responsibilities the EU had taken 
before the adoption of the global strategy 2016, e.g. R2P. By cooperating and 
trading with regimes that have been named and shamed as the perpetrators of 
mass atrocities by the world community, the EU itself risks to be named and 
shamed as a power which could have responded adequately but failed to do so.
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The content analysis of the official documents and statements reveal that the 
key EU’s institutions diverge in their understanding of the scope of the EU’s 
commitment under R2P. The comparative analysis of the instruments in terms 
of EU responses to mass atrocities in three cases – Libya, South Sudan, and 
Myanmar - highlights the risk of both over-promising and under-delivering. 
In light of the above said the EU’s capacity to act quickly and decisively in 
response to mass atrocities based on the thorough examination of three cases 
seems weak. However, there is still room to do more to improve the imple-
mentation by the EU of its commitments within R2P.
The EU could establish an automatic set of events that trigger the introduction 
of particular tools. The negotiation of specific benchmarks concerning human 
rights obligations with the clear focus on the adoption of appropriate meas-
ures in case of a failure to meet such a benchmark will help the EU to give a 
clear message to the third countries regarding their losses in case of violation 
of human rights. Besides, the particular criteria should be introduced which 
will allow to withdraw the tool selected earlier without being later accused 
of subjectivity. This would prevent a situation when a decision regarding the 
provision of the development aid or withdrawal of sanctions by the EU (e.g. in 
Myanmar, the EU sanctions were lifted even despite the fact the international 
NGOs pointed at the on-going ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
in the Rakhine State) can be adopted even despite any improvement of the sit-
uation. Such an approach will make the Union’s policy more transparent and 
reduce the risk of delay in the selection of an appropriate tool.
The design of a separate mass atrocity policy beyond its conflict management 
policy is crucial for effective implementation by the EU of its commitments 
within R2P. It is time to draw a clear distinction between these two policies. 
The development by the EU of the separate mass atrocity policy which will be 
able to mitigate the risk factors that result in the commission of such crimes, 
as well as strengthening the further internal coordination among EU institu-
tions will contribute to a better understanding of the EU’s commitment to the 
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R2P and enhancing narrative coherence.
There are certain ways to improve the effectiveness of the human rights con-
ditionality clause in the EU GSP scheme and thus turn foreign trade policy 
into an effective tool in response to mass atrocities that do not compete but 
complements the CFSP. Amongst these, wider use of ex-ante assessments and 
reliance on the reports of other credible international organizations, which 
could lead to the decision not to provide trade preferences until the concerned 
country demonstrates its compliance with the human rights, is required. The 
threshold enabling a country to be admitted to the GSP scheme should be 
increased. Taking into account the fact that the withdrawal of trade in the re-
sponse of human right breach will result in restricted access to the EU market 
and inevitably affect social and economic human rights of millions in the con-
cerned country, the focus should be placed on the assessment of the country’s 
capacity to comply with the human rights clause before signing any trade 
agreements.
Summing up, the EU should ensure that its actions especially those with the 
focus on the  CSDP component do not duplicate the actions of other actors 
such as the UN, NATO, etc. Any ambition to revise the intergovernmental 
bases of Union’s foreign and defense policy and manage it as the single-mar-
ket policies will inevitably leave the room for further disputes among mem-
ber-states which before joining regional economic integration had integrated 
militarily within NATO. The EU has a wide range of instruments which de-
spite being too modest in the actual mass atrocities, can be adequately used 
in the prevention or stabilization period. The EU should not strive to fill the 
niche which does not fit per se. By focusing on a limited number of key issues 
and promoting synergies with other actors involved in addressing the mass 
atrocity cases it is possible to achieve tangible and lasting results. 
While these observations concern the EU’s scope of commitments under R2P 
at the stage of response to mass atrocities, further research is required to assess 
the EU’s capacity to implement its commitments within R2P at the stage of 
prevention and rebuilding where the EU’s comprehensive approach to exter-
nal conflict and crises plays a crucial role.
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